United States
The United States position, in terms of the Churchill proposal, is analyzed via the accounts of its principal war planner, General Wedemeyer and the key players, Generals Eisenhower, Marshall and Bradley. Also considered are sources such as President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the Department of the Army Historical Series of that era. We learned that failure to have a National Policy left no reasonable basis to weigh the soft-underbelly proposal against; it left a post World War II Europe dominated by Soviet Russia; and left four US Divisions permanently deployed in Europe. The United States analysis also points out the oversensitivity of the Americans to the British in terms of their post World War II colonial operations and interests.
Britain
Mr. Churchill is the primary source for both the British perspective and definition as to what constitutes the soft-underbelly. Churchill's World War I and II experience in the Balkans is considered.
C
The British learned to be more thorough in their proposal for a Balkan E campaign. The British had to justify that the Balkans were important for the future of a free Europe and most important, this justification had to convince US planners of the need to divert precious resources.
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" " ' " " '" "" "" -" °" " " "" '"" " """" " " " "' .. ." "" "'" " " -" ""'" " " "'""" " -" "t-" --x" " " ""jI Russia The Russian perspective is dealt with in terms of what would have happened if they got only enough lend-lease to keep them in the war and to clear the Nazis from Russia. Also considered is Stalin's position regarding the soft-underbelly, i.e., was it to Stalin's advantage, to his post-war ambitions to say no to a Balkan campaign by the allies?
Finally, this history and its lessons learned are applied to a future European scenario--what should our objectives be in a future European war?
In summary, the paper demonstrates Clausewitz's dictum--that war is an extension of politics and that in order to wage war successfully a country must have political objectives. •.--..
INTRODUCTION
The political object -the original motive for war -tells us both the military objectives to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.1
Clausewitz ON WAR
In World War II, the allies lost the Balkans because they ignored Winston Churchill's suggested soft-underbelly approach into this area and more importantly, because they lacked clearly defined political objectives against which to weigh such a campaign. An additional case could be made for the loss of the whole of Eastern Europe for the same reason.
If we accept the proposition that the strategic goal for Europe should have been the restoration of the pre-World War II balance of power (minus Hitler) with various safeguards that would be woven into the details of such an objective, for example -a democratized Germany and a neutralized buffer of states between Eastern and Western Europe, then the Russians could have been given whatever was necessary to defeat the Germans in Russia. If the Allies had an agreed upon political objective that was more than "Europe first" or "enter the continent of Europe, and ...undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces" 2 4 Pogue concludes that this lack of political direction "obviously takes * us beyond the scope of this study into the making of foreign policy. ' 5
The purpose of this paper then, is to explore the area of foreign policy and strategic objectives; to explore Churchill's proposal for a softunderbelly approach into the Balkans; and to take a hard look at the strategic thinking of the British, the Americans and the Russians and review what happened because of a lack of political objectives.
Finally, in a postscript I will take the lessons learned and apply them to a future NATO scenario. Troops and shipping in the Mediterranean are discussed by Churchill and he makes the point that two to three divisions were all that were needed and these resources were already in theatre. Without stating how or where forces were to be committed, Churchill was certain that Turkey could be neutralized, the Eastern Mediterranean could be controlled and the supply routes to Russia could be shortened with less cost to the allies. 8 Churchill was definitely aware of Allied concerns for the success or failure of an OVERLORD invasion; he had been intimately involved in debating how much combat power should be left in Italy and North Africa. I pondered on my mission to this sullen, sinister Bolshevik State I had once tried so hard to strangle at its birth, and which until Hitler appeared, I had regarded as the mortal foe of civilized freedom. with politics let loose amongst those peoples, we may have a wave of disorder and wholesale Communism set going all over those parts of Europe. This may even be the danger in Italy, but certainly in Greece and the Balkans.. .The Bolshevisation of a broken and ruined Europe remains a definite possibility, to be guarded against by a supply of food and work and interim allied control. we comprehended the future more truly than those coldblooded calculators, and understood their dangers and their interests better than they did themselves. 2 7 What is interesting is the fact that shortly afterwards, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Rumania fell quickly to Russian dominance only to be wrenched away shortly thereafter by the Nazis. More important is the fact that Churchill divined the original intent of the Soviet-Nazi NonAggression Pact--to buy time for the Russians to marshall their armies;
to buy time to defend and eventually defeat the Nazis. 2 8 Suffice it say, Churchill understood the Communists, the Nazis and history. The directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was very simple, merely instructing us to land on the coast of France and thereafter to destroy the German ground forces... This purpose of destroying enemy forces was always our guiding principle; geographical points were considered only in relation to their importance to the enemy in the conduct of his operations or to us as centers of supply and communications in proceeding to the destruction of enemy armies or air forces. 2 9 America in World War II remained a very idealistic nation, protected by her seas and sense of isolationism. We need only to remind ourselves ...he had tried the back door at the Dardanelles, through which he sought unsuccessfully to effect a junction with the Czar. Certainly it would have demanded a logistics miracle to supply a British army committed to fighting its way into Central Europe via the Balkans. 3 5 Wedemeyer goes on to point out that "1941-42 was not 1914-18, and
Churchill should have realized it." 3 6 There are a number of important facts to be gleaned from Wedemeyer's book. In relying upon the land forces of the Soviet Union to deliver the knockout blow, we were storing up infinite trouble for ourselves at the peace table. At the war's end, the Communists would be in a favorable position to deliver mighty blows in political, economic, and psychological fields against their allies. 4 4 In trying to understand the Russian grand strategy for World War II and in particular the strategy for the Balkans, we need to distinguish between military and political objectives. We need to do so at least to 4 7 It is clear that the lack of political objectives led to Stalin and unfortunately to a decision to leave the Balkans alone. Eventually this decision left the Balkans to communist domination; moreover, the lack of clear political objectives, stated early on prior to United States involvement, lost the whole of Eastern Europe to communist domination and enslavement. Churchill tells us he only wanted one-tenth of the total forces committed to Europe which equals two or three divisions for the Balkans.
For the Mediterranean, those forces would be distributed 4/5 in Italy (already there), 1/10 in Corsica and 1/10 in the Balkans. 5 1
The He points to a DOD study that notes that while the "richer countries should pay a more than proportional share, we're carrying 20 percent more than our fair share and Japan is carrying one/fourth of its own." 5 5 Kinsley makes two other key points as regards the effects of this economical/military wrench-up:
The allies can shoulder more of the Defense burden directly, or they can find ways to reimburse us for some of our expenses. If Europe and Japan were to devote just one percent more of their respective GNP's to defense, in a way that spared us a like amount, this alone would slice $50 billion off our deficit. 43. In the US Army WWII historical reports, Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare 1943-1944, Maurice Matloff discusses these divisions under a paragraph titled "A Question of Manpower," pp. 264-269. Matloff states that 90 divisions are based on the timing of operations, i.e., delay manpower and divisions to the East as well as pare down on operations in Europe and the Mediterrean, on logistics (each division required a large logistical tail) and the need to pare down the current combat support and service support already deployed overseas. Hence, my contention that "the manpower was there" if we were seriously considering a two to three division effort in the Balkans. Timing could have been changed or manpower gained from combat support or additional divisions built. Easy as it is to look back in history, most assuredly, everyone was keying in on the importance of the post-WW II Balkans but not taking action to provide solutions. 
